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Michael Finus

13 works· latest 2020· 3 institutionscluster: provisionalORCID 0000-0001-8248-2768

h-index13

i1013

Citations1,607

Works here13

Most cited in this library

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation2001 · 366 citations
Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges2008 · 232 citations
Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements2006 · 194 citations
Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution2003 · 134 citations
Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control1998 · 96 citations

Works

13 shown

The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance

Environmental and Resource Economics·2020·2 authors·Open access

26citations

Measures to enhance the effectiveness of international climate agreements: The case of border carbon adjustments

European Economic Review·2020·2 authors·Open access

69citations

Modesty May Pay !

Journal of Public Economic Theory·2008·2 authors

92citations

Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges

International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics·2008·1 author·Open access

232citations

Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements

The Review of International Organizations·2006·3 authors

194citations

COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING

Natural Resource Modeling·2006·2 authors·Open access

85citations

The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements

Oxford Economic Papers·2006·3 authors·Open access

81citations

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Economics of Governance·2006·3 authors·Open access

95citations

Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control: a partition function approach

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks·2003·2 authors·chapter

64citations

Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks·2003·1 author·chapter

134citations

The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?

Journal of Public Economics·2002·2 authors

73citations

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks·2001·1 author·book

366citations

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

Public Choice·1998·2 authors

96citations