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Adam Pautz · Study

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Adam Pautz

14 works· latest 2021· 3 institutionscluster: provisionalORCID 0000-0002-9620-8249

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Citations1,343

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Most cited in this library

INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE2007 · 188 citations
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?2013 · 172 citations
Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?2010 · 172 citations
WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES?2009 · 125 citations
Perception2021 · 96 citations

Works

14 shown

Routledge eBooks·2021·1 author·book

96citations

The Arationality of Perception: Comments on Susanna Siegel

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research·2020·1 author·Open access

25citations

Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness

·2019·2 authors

72citations

Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

Oxford University Press eBooks·2013·1 author·chapter

172citations

Do the benefits of naïve realism outweigh the costs? Comments on fish, perception, hallucination and illusion

Philosophical Studies·2012·1 author

33citations

CAN DISJUNCTIVISTS EXPLAIN OUR ACCESS TO THE SENSIBLE WORLD?

Philosophical Issues·2011·1 author·Open access

93citations

DO THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS REST ON A MISTAKE?

Philosophical Issues·2010·1 author

89citations

Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?

Oxford University Press eBooks·2010·1 author·chapter

172citations

A Simple View of Consciousness

·2010·1 author·chapter·Open access

83citations

WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES?

The Philosophical Quarterly·2009·1 author

125citations

The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality

The Monist·2008·1 author·Open access

60citations

INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE

Philosophical Perspectives·2007·1 author

188citations

Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1

Australasian Journal of Philosophy·2006·1 author

54citations

Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism1

Noûs·2006·1 author

81citations