Supererogation, inside and out: Toward an adequate scheme for common-sense morality1

Abstract

It is often assumed that 1) supererogation entails praiseworthiness, and 1) is even encoded in what has been called the “standard analysis” of supererogatory acts as acts that are optional and praiseworthy, but not blameworthy to omit. A pervasive presupposition is 2) the equivalence of action beyond the call of duty and supererogation. Meanwhile, it is often thought that (3) to omit an agent-favoring prerogative is supererogatory (a supererogatory omission). The paper sketches a simple conceptual framework for an enriched array of moral concepts helps us see that (2)-(3) are false and not really reconcilable with the classical conception of supererogation, and that the standard analysis is itself false and not reconcilable with the classical conception either. Points of analogy and disanalogy for suberogation are briefly explored. The investigation reflects the general need to distinguish and integrate act-evaluative and agent-evaluative moral appraisal.

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