Political beliefs of the Soviet citizen: sources of support for regime norms

Abstract

Students of Soviet affairs have long been concerned with how the Soviet political elite generates popular support. The conventional view of the Soviet system before the death of Stalin is summed up in a chapter in Merle Fainsod's How Russia Is Ruled entitled: “Terror as a System of Power.” That chapter's first sentence is, “Terror is the linchpin of modern totalitarianism” (Fainsod 1961: 354). Seweryn Bialer's later formulation, describing the Stalinist period, is similar: “[TJerror functioned principally not as a tool of social change , but as a normal method of rule and governance ” (Bialer 1980: 12). If it is true that “totalitarian dictatorship may be regarded as a substitute for other forms of coordination with a stronger groundwork in popular consensus” (Moore 1954), then the critical question is: What has been the method of achieving consensus, or support, for the established political order in the Soviet Union, once terror was no longer the main instrument of control? It is worth recalling Vera Dunham's observation that “In Stalin's time – and even in Stalin's worst times – the regime was supported by more than simple terror, a truism still overlooked from time to time” (Dunham 1976: 13). But the balance of methods of generating mass support is said to have shifted in the post-Stalin era (by Dunham's account, in the late Stalin era). Two main methods of generating mass support for the Soviet system in the post-Stalin era have been emphasized in the scholarly literature: ( a ) agitation, propaganda, or, more generally, education; and ( b ) the manipulation of material rewards.

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