Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation

Abstract

The deontological conception of epistemic justification is “viable” only if deontological judgments about beliefs are sometimes true. This chapter is primarily with the inference, the move from involuntarism about belief to the falsity of all deontological judgments about beliefs. William Alston has given the most thorough defense of the contingent inability thesis, the thesis that as a contingent matter of fact, people are not able to acquire beliefs voluntarily. Deontological epistemic judgments can be true even if people lack effective voluntary control over their beliefs. In a paradigm case of voluntary action, people deliberate about their options and then select one. In this case, deliberation is a key aspect of the process that leads to voluntary action. Alston characterizes epistemic deontologism as the view that analyzes “epistemic justification in terms of freedom from blame for believing”.

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