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Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan
16 references·7 citing·31 second hop
Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan (2012)Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency…How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)How do family ownership, cont…Analysis of Panel Data (2003)Analysis of Panel DataAgency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Agency costs of free cash flo…The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)The Cross-Section of Expected…Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value (1990)Additional evidence on equity…The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice (1988)The Determinants of Capital S…Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Large Shareholders and Corpor…The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)The Structure of Corporate Ow…Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Credit Rationing in Markets w…The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)The Determination of Financia…Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Determinants of corporate bor…THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS …The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency…CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEOR…The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)The Cost of Capital, Corporat…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Corporate governance, cash holding, and firm performance in an emerging market (2023)Corporate governance, cash ho…Corporate governance looking back to look forward in Pakistan: a review, synthesis and future research agenda (2022)Corporate governance looking …Board Financial Expertise and Corporate Cash Holdings: Moderating Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Emerging Family Firms (2021)Board Financial Expertise and…Impact of Excess Control, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on Firm Performance of Diversified Group Firms in Pakistan (2017)Impact of Excess Control, Own…BAĞIMSIZ DENETİM KALİTESİNİN FİNANSAL PERFORMANS ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİNİN İNCELENMESİ: BORSA İSTANBUL’DA BİR UYGULAMA (2017)BAĞIMSIZ DENETİM KALİTESİNİN …An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index (2016)An empirical analysis of corp…Dividend Policy and Role of Corporate Governance in Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan (2014)Dividend Policy and Role of C…Increases in risk and in risk aversion (1974)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)Financial Dependence and Growth (1996)Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares (1961)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment (2008)DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES OF CORPORATIONS AMONG DIVIDENDS, RETAINED EARNINGS AND TAXES (1956)Law and Finance (1998)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)GROWTH, BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS (1982)Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends (1984)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets (1965)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency (1993)Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects (2002)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models (1995)Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2001)Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties (2002)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*19,431 cited
  • 1992The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns17,251 cited
  • 1958The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment14,494 cited
  • 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing13,160 cited
  • 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
  • 1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers9,308 cited
  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 2003Analysis of Panel Data7,858 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]

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6,743 cited
  • 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
  • 1988The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice6,108 cited
  • 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value4,311 cited
  • 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
  • 2005How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?4,190 cited
  • 1977The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach4,163 cited
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    • 2016An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index35 cited
    • 2023Corporate governance, cash holding, and firm performance in an emerging market31 cited
    • 2017Impact of Excess Control, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on Firm Performance of Diversified Group Firms in Pakistan25 cited
    • 2022Corporate governance looking back to look forward in Pakistan: a review, synthesis and future research agenda21 cited
    • 2021Board Financial Expertise and Corporate Cash Holdings: Moderating Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Emerging Family Firms18 cited
    • 2017BAĞIMSIZ DENETİM KALİTESİNİN FİNANSAL PERFORMANS ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİNİN İNCELENMESİ: BORSA İSTANBUL’DA BİR UYGULAMA16 cited
    • 2014Dividend Policy and Role of Corporate Governance in Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan16 cited