Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate

Abstract

Many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language commit themselves to some version or other of the truthmaker principle: the thesis that truths must be made true by something. Such truthmaker theorists have sought to justify their approach in various ways. Many have claimed that the truthmaker principle is a distillation of what is worth salvaging in the correspondence theory of truth; others have suggested that an adherence to the truthmaker principle enables us to avoid pernicious strains of idealism; yet others have argued that the principle has an essential explanatory function, such as that of enabling us to properly formulate the problem of universals. This volume sees both established leaders in the field and up-and-coming philosophical voices contribute to an examination of the claims made on behalf of truthmaker theory. An introductory essay by the editors introduces the reader to the key issues raised in the papers that follow. The said papers consider, amongst other matters, how the truthmaker principle is best formulated, whether it is well motivated, whether it genuinely has the explanatory roles claimed for it, and whether various more modest principles might serve equally well.

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