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Abstract The standard philosophical account of explanation-the deductive nomological model in which a phenomenon is explained when a description of it is derived from statements of laws and initial conditions-does not do justice to the explanations generally offered in the life sciences. There, instead, explanations often take the form of specifications of mechanisms, wherein an overall activity of a system is decomposed into subfunctions, and these are then localized to components of the system (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993; Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000). Mental activities have been no exception. The brain (including the central nervous system) has long been taken to be the bodily organ responsible for mental activities, and the task has been to decompose mental functions and identify the resulting component functions with parts of the brain. In many respects, this effort embodies the vision of Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828).
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