The Clerk's Tale and the Forces of Habit

Abstract

The Clerk is untimely. He is busy contemplating sophisms when he should be gearing up to tell a merry tale. Or at least that is how Harry Bailey reads him: “I trowe ye studie aboute som sophyme;But Salomon seith ‘every thyng hath tyme.’”(IV 5–6)1 Now is the time for “pley,” not pondering (IV 10). Harry Bailey advises the Clerk to refrain from preaching and to speak plainly, reminding him that he is not sermonizing at Lent or petitioning the king. He worries that the Clerk is dragging old habits of thought and speech into the novel situation of the pilgrimage. One can take the Clerk out of Oxenford, but taking Oxenford out of the Clerk requires some disciplining.Harry's concern about the persistence of habits is echoed in the tale itself. The Clerk weaves strands of commentary into his translation of Petrarch's story, interjections that vary between outrage, admiration, and rationalization. As A. C. Spearing puts it, the Clerk begins his tale as a literary critic, dismissing Petrarch's “prohemye” as “impertinent,” but quickly becomes a moral critic (IV 43, 54).2 He does more than simply evaluate Walter and Griselda's behavior; he tries to explain it as well. How does Griselda manage to endure such brutality at the hands of her husband? Why does Walter persist in testing his wife beyond measure? Like many readers and critics of the Griselda story, the Clerk tries to dispel some of the scandal embedded in his source material. Amy W. Goodwin has pointed out how both Petrarch and his source, Boccaccio, gloss the action of the Griselda narrative with “ethical frameworks” that are indebted to the literature of the remedial virtues.3 The Clerk's commentary is similarly informed by theories of “moral vertu,” which, we learn in the General Prologue, infuse his speech (I 307). In particular, I will argue, the Clerk seizes upon the formative power of habit, a concept latent in Boccaccio's and Petrarch's “ethical frameworks.”4 Habit plays an important role in the Griselda narrative because habit endows character with consistency and the consistency of character—both Griselda's and Walter's—is precisely what is at stake throughout the tale. By exploring how Griselda and Walter are influenced by habits, both good and bad, the Clerk illuminates, if not resolves, some of the vexing questions surrounding their behavior.Many of the critical readings that explore the Clerk's engagement with contemporary philosophical debates focus on issues of agency and volition.5 Such a focus is encouraged in part by the way the tale amplifies the voluntaristic diction present in its sources.6 One persistent strain of interpretation reads the tale as a “voluntaristic allegory,” to use Rodney Delasanta's term, in which Walter's “inscrutable will” represents the unlimited potentia absoluta of God, to which Griselda, as the stand-in for the patient human soul, must submit.7 In Linda Georgianna's reading, it is Griselda who possesses the“mysteriously self-authorized” will.8 According to Georgianna, Griselda's enigmatic capability to assent to Walter's demands represents a disavowal of the prudential “avysement” that characterizes Walter and his subjects. As influential as both of these arguments have been, they overlook the ways in which each character is guided by the force of habit. Neither Walter nor Griselda acts ex nihilo; their mysterious acts of will have antecedents and conditions of possibility, which the Clerk attempts to lay bare. He pays particular attention to how their habits have been shaped by the places that they have inhabited. In pursuing the co-implication of habit and habitat, I build on the work of William F. Woods, who argues that the Canterbury Tales demonstrates “how characters arise through emplacement, how they create themselves by dwelling in place.”9 Habits are formed in the intersection of the voluntary and the involuntary, and it is this region in which the Clerk's Tale takes place.As a reader of Aristotle, the Clerk would be familiar with how important the Aristotelian concept of hexis—translated by the medieval Latin habitus—was for medieval ethical theory.10 For Aristotle, a habitus is an acquired inclination or tendency to act in a certain way, which is formed by exercise and repetition. While each person is born with the capacity for virtue (and vice), some people are born with so-called “natural virtues,” which skew them towards virtuous acts.11 Just as the good lyre-player is not born good at her craft, however, the virtuous person must develop her natural potential for virtue through exercise (Ethics, 1103a26–b2). A habitus is complete when the agent has internalized the virtuous actions modeled by parents and teachers and acts for the sake of virtue and not simply because she has been inculcated into doing so. Acting from habit does not mean, then, acting involuntarily or unthinkingly, as the Modern English word habit tends to imply; rather, it means acting efficiently, enjoyably, and appropriately.12Even before Robert Grosseteste's mid-thirteenth-century translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Aristotelian concept of habitus had worked its way into the vocabulary of medieval ethics via authors such as Boethius and Cicero.13 In his influential De institutione novitiorum, Hugh of St. Victor insists that virtue can be cultivated through the proper habituation of the body: “Just as inconstancy of mind brings forth irregular motions of the body, so also the mind is strengthened and made constant when the body is restrained through the process of discipline.”14 Not all thinkers were as convinced of the value of bodily discipline. Some believed virtue originated from nature or as a gift of grace, and, as a result, afforded little scope for its cultivation. Also at issue was the question of who was authorized to cultivate habitus. Katharine Breen points out how the alternate sense of habitus as a garment worn by monks coexisted and was often conflated with the notion of habitus as an enduring disposition of character. Breen argues that the relation between the two senses was contested in late medieval culture, as the cultivation of virtuous habitus was increasingly seen as permissible for laypeople and not the exclusive prerogative of the spiritual elite. Fourteenth-century England witnessed what Breen terms a “crisis of habit,” which was precipitated by academic debates about “when, where, in whom, and by what means virtuous dispositions can be inculcated.”15 The Clerk, I would like to suggest, participates in these debates through his tale.Although one could in theory develop a bad habitus, medieval thinkers usually opposed good habitus to consuetudo, which Breen defines as “non-rational repetition.”16 Few premodern thinkers devoted as much time to the theme of consuetudo as Augustine. Consuetudo plays a crucial role in Augustinian moral psychology. It is largely what makes sinful behavior so difficult to correct and the reason why a sinner often feels that he sins involuntarily. Augustine clarifies the relation between sin and consuetudo in Confessions: sinful deeds accumulate in the memory, which causes the pleasure derived from them to multiply and compels the agent to repeat the acts in search of this heightened pleasure. The force of habit deadens and binds the soul, which Augustine compares to in his and to a by is not however, is the in the of by consuetudo, the to the proper of it to a Augustine to the that a then, has an potential in medieval if to the of habit can the of the will by virtuous actions however, bad behavior it takes on the force of and the to act The Clerk this through the of Griselda, who the habit of and who in strengthened by is often by critics as an of natural or is the that Walter when he Griselda on of the (IV of her of the of the and as the people Walter insists that virtue from God, not of God, of the which they been and Walter's of virtue as an gift with what we would from a In the is born and and in his or her the of than the of its Griselda, however, is not her not to God, as Walter but to her Walter about testing his she how she has been to his thyng I and ye with as ye she is in and, to a she had her in as the she at in Walter's she it is the reason she has been to in the for so While Griselda does not out the of or the is on acquired Walter's of to of its virtue is a gift from God, it as in an as in an (IV For Griselda, the formative value of be so the between habitus and Griselda's habits are in part by the she has In the Clerk's Petrarch's to the is she from is more important than her The will be to Walter's because she has been in a that not to exercise of which was a According to the is what a person to a of Walter's is so and so that it and that been and the of the For it and the as it and it For this endure by the that been Walter's has been from the of by her her potential or inclination towards will be medieval were of how the of could the of a habitus. Aristotle, and William of that the moral were not and one could certain but not how moral an for Now the that some a who the at had to and acts but little for moral be with in some than a at an or born into an or an will to some the of moral As Petrarch puts it in The of is the in the of and habits of if is in is in places I would a not Clerk also that is in He Petrarch's of the that the of Griselda's For the Clerk, the of the an a of which that of that and of that the The a that is on in translation of the of the the to that in In the of in for how the person who is with is in than the who is to is also spiritual value in from and not on or As the of Augustine advises in of the he all his with his have he be in In what medieval ethical theory to the an the conditions by by and the of Griselda a of “natural as puts The of her are A on she been she she she or she and for made and she and to The is with and that the nature of her of what makes Walter's in her so is how he the of her is that she were seen so a in that was to The is it can both and be a that points to the co-implication of habit and by In its of what has ethics of the acts as a to Walter's where, as we will it be with is (IV has that the Clerk's of which such as her constant and the of in the of the It is not to that the Clerk's are to be the Clerk's and to Petrarch's of Griselda's are I to the reader for Griselda's about the role by her The Clerk does not the between and virtue in Petrarch so much as it by exploring the between habit and It is the of the that for the habit of to the For up was was of the than of the The on A between and virtue in the when the Clerk why the people Walter that (IV In Petrarch's is that the as a often Walter's of Griselda is a act of not the of a as it is for the It is to take the Clerk's if we it as from the of the they were as into and with the of one virtuous they of people are often One it would is for them to it (Ethics, the the Clerk be to the between and he a source of and by his (I and habits of he an to the of have pointed out how the Clerk, a of and reader of Aristotle, is a of a tale by the the his makes him a he is to the of embedded in his the the of is by the two For up was was of the than of the and for she but While the two that Griselda's constant has shaped her virtuous the two the Griselda because she be does not to on the she also with the of her is an at can a in the been she (IV is both and for does a of By Griselda's as a the Clerk her that her her According to the or the Clerk is opposed to and by of The from up was to she the of a habitus, to the Aristotelian argues that a person should be to good acts however, a person a habitus when she begins acting for the sake of virtue and not simply because she has been inculcated to a certain of is by the and internalized by the Petrarch so as the Griselda is by The Clerk beyond Griselda with and By doing he a to what has as the of Walter and who with that or virtue is to Not the the cultivation of virtue is not to the for that is it to the It is the who has much to Walter about the of her Griselda insists that habits be puts on habit of a these the old habits Griselda is from her to at the of her for in was in Griselda's translation from to the by in of As Breen it, way of which he in his to as he throughout and by his but a on he are the and as as Griselda in her from one to does she not between the two of the tale have the of Griselda's actions at the argues that Griselda's in the of her into question her For Aristotle, one have a formed habitus the of is what the of habits to The person who how behavior be in one situation and in The of is embedded in the of this endure by the that been Few readers of the the Clerk, would be to that Walter's are the Clerk Griselda's he does to what in the translation from to the of has Griselda to endure the of As I will explore in the of this the Clerk the and of Walter's the by God, of which was a Walter's are not (IV have Walter to Griselda for his so that he can the of her but this as well. The more Griselda demonstrates this the more Walter is to it the Clerk to her for Walter's that they a As much as the Clerk Griselda's habit of when to the it her to for good and bad, Griselda's habit of her to at in both and in Walter's the of habit him out of He and of behavior that are for testing to the of her by Griselda and the Clerk, who him as in the of habit. Griselda's is in her to him: thyng I and ye with as ye the tale Walter his in the of his and the of Griselda by that he is by the of and He advises Griselda to her as of or of (IV In her however, she makes it that she has not been she the for what they Griselda believed that Walter has been by his towards her would be to him his who from Griselda that her has little to with Walter's that he will act similarly towards his ye with the present her that his are in into the present of ye however, Griselda for the is but her to as the of his is in its It to Walter's wife that him means with the constant of of to as the of Walter's (IV has that Walter's be is who can out at him and tell him who he is or that he In this Griselda to Walter in the and tell him who he of Clerk is also to Walter in the As is the Clerk's Tale from its in the to which the of these and how Walter's actions He acts because he is by the of consuetudo that Augustine in and The Clerk's of argues that Walter much time I that he what on his present was his for to and on he he that was of for that Walter is busy when he should be in one of the many and (IV by his the to his The moral to in English or not a is largely on how much he in relation to his and In the of the Clerk is that his are As who Walter an with the of with his his time to and for the (I The we learn in the General Prologue, of that a seith that (I The in question be who a of In Augustine the of to how habit the will in taking pleasure in to the Griselda, Walter's of in of like a of the that Griselda so Walter's for also him as than the Griselda, as medieval as one of the have that Walter's in of that he is to the of the of which are to in of this in Walter's Griselda's in the of a and Walter's to his are at to his his and in he and hath The Clerk's it is the of his that the sense of Walter his will his to act on the I was I been in (IV important to him is the he with his in to the demands and Griselda, he will on this of and I as I have with in and Like Griselda, Walter the by his habits are by the places he has Walter to take a the people his to his old the of the with in the people his (IV the Clerk has Petrarch's of via the of the In Walter as the people are doing more than the between and are out what Walter's of According to Walter's to and him the of by the to his and all of his time is not a way to from his it is also a way to the is more in the Clerk's Tale because Walter is not the of his as he is in but part of a that in Griselda, to her is by the Clerk, Walter to the of his by their Walter time in of the of his As the tale however, it becomes that his to the present from its in his to the Walter's to his out to be Walter his to Griselda, he makes it that in he will not the of his he will the of more He advises Griselda to ye with good and that I or ye to it, I by word and I In from Griselda, Walter to the he the of for the like the he will as Griselda (IV The for has a Augustine how the of throughout a but the from does not when one and and and to be by and and as one to in Walter's on Griselda's to his like a from an of Augustine how he would at his and parents if they to to his when I not way, because I was not or it be to I to be with for their and with people who were not to By to or between the of and its Walter to up the sense of that has been by what he to be the in He his at a He Griselda as the to she acts the part he binds in to the and to the of their reminding Griselda of her he to take her he the in ye and in that was He to that she does not from the that he has for For the Clerk, this is in his mind Griselda has her He what for to and and som it for a as for I that it a that it is in and in he is not the testing of Griselda rather, it is to her she has been have been an time to Griselda, but that time has Walter is He to that Griselda has her by the of the Clerk, on the has the Griselda has the habit of tendency to Griselda and out of more than a of He is to to Griselda he is to the of the as it that this had but a in his his for to he out of his his he for the Walter's is as it does not but The Clerk Petrarch's of Walter's as by the of a Walter tries to the but he it from his For the of largely from its in habit. Consuetudo the which in the of to not to are with a of the mind which, when it is up by the does not to it, but is by of a will are by the his if he was she in The Clerk's Walter's when he the he is the one The Clerk makes Walter's when he upon his of been of they have a of as they were to that of that Walter the force of his As points Walter is an but one to his and not the will of his as he Not in the Clerk's of a person to a stake the by Augustine to the process of habit into The of a will is By to habit is and habit to which is becomes By these as it one to a a Walter is by (IV which is how the Clerk Petrarch's The Clerk's the of the who the of the sinner to the of sinful as seith he out of his that is with the of Walter's of Griselda were to his his to her has him to the of has The pleasure Walter from testing Griselda of and that he to (IV as at the of the he feels it to that he has out of and compares the that Augustine from the of to of a to is pursuing like was by the of the of his by his a in and out of as a way to both the and of his this is a with a however, as the an role in the his The is to the of in to this of plays a of throughout the tale. the power of and he and his wife and in to the of his situation by the of and and that are by the of the Clerk Walter as by a he does not its in some he is convinced that Walter's He Walter's as part of the reason he is so by He has seen of power that they a (IV Walter is of a a patient in this his than A for Walter's behavior when the Clerk Walter's as what they (IV The Clerk is in how Walter's as a and the of bad if it were not so for and to act Walter would have the to a habit from a the Clerk as points consuetudo as the of For in Augustine how his the use of as a for and, by doing encouraged to their of In exploring the co-implication of and habits, the Clerk from more of Walter takes at his the of the the Clerk has on Walter acts as (IV as he he He is to that him as a and and him to if of He is not to the to Griselda and becomes to The to which Walter the of habit is made when he to Griselda why he her to to the in time for his he of “I have for in and I were of old the as a to Griselda for the Walter upon a he at He has to Griselda, to the way she to his old she has in to that the (IV He that she can more to him what he As Griselda in her to if w

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