Reformulación de las relaciones entre los condicionamientos operante y respondiente: El sentido de la crítica de J. Dewey al concepto de arco reflejo

Abstract

La Psicologia del Aprendizaje se habria estructurado historicamente en torno a la dis-cusion sobre los tipos de condicionamiento existentes y sobre sus relaciones mutuas. Desde la formulacion por Pavlov del condicionamiento clasico y por Thorndike del condicionamiento instrumental, las posturas principales habrian sido la monofactorial y la bifactorial. La pri-mera defenderia que solo hay un proceso de condicionamiento, el clasico, y se caracterizaria basicamente por una concepcion contiguista de la conducta. La segunda entenderia que hay dos tipos de condicionamiento, el instrumental y el clasico, o el operante y el respondiente, segun la terminologia skinneriana, y se decantaria por una comprension contingenciai de la conducta. En esa polemica habria otra posibilidad logica que ningun autor habria defendido como tal: un planteamiento monofactorial que asumiera una concepcion contingenciai de la con-ducta. Esta es precisamente nuestra propuesta: habria solo un proceso de condicionamiento, el operante, de forma que el condicionamiento respondiente estaria totalmente supeditado al operante, siendo solo un efecto fenomenico-operatorio de este. Tomando como contexto este planteamiento, cabe recuperar ahora la figura de J. Dewey y su critica al concepto de arco reflejo, elaborada mucho antes de la formulacion de los dos tipos de condicionamiento. Este autor propuso una reconstruccion del concepto de arco reflejo en terminos de un proceso de coordinacion sensorio-motora. Segun su reconstruc-cion, no existirian por separado los supuestos componentes de un arco reflejo, las sensa-ciones o estimulos, las ideas o conexiones centrales y los movimientos o las respuestas motoras. Por el contrario, Dewey entendia que solo habria en donde los estimulos y las respuestas se co-determinarian, o co-definirian, o co-ordinarian mutuamente, de tal manera que no habria estimulos o sensaciones que no fueran ya ellos mismos complejos, estimulos coordinados con actividades motoras (la actividad de ver, por ejem-plo); asi como no habria respuestas que no fueran ya ellas mismas tambien com-plejos, respuestas coordinadas con estimulos en cuanto que transformacion de los mismos (el cambio activo de ver una cosa a ver otra, tambien por ejemplo). Esta critica al concepto de arco reflejo de J. Dewey tendria un sentido historico muy valioso al permitir la comprension de la existencia de un solo proceso de condicionamiento en el que los reflejos condicionados serian intrinsecamente fenomenico-operatorios y efectos o momentos dependientes siempre del devenir contingenciai de las conductas operantes, es decir, de actos complejos que englobarian o coordinarian a otros actos complejos proporcionalmente mas simples, los respondientes = Leaming Psychology would have historically structured around the discussion about the existing types of conditioning and about their mutual relationship. From Pavlov's classical conidtioning and Thorndike's instrumental condictioning, the main positions would have been the monofactorial one and the bifactorial one. The later would defend that there is only one conditioning process, the classical one, and it would be characterized by a contiguoustical understanding of behavior. The former would understand that there are two types of conditioning, the instrumenal and the classical ones, or the operant and the respondent ones, according to the skinnerian terminology, and it would prefer a contingencial understanding of the behavior. Within such polemics, it would be another logical possibility that no author would have defended in its own terms: a monofactorial approach that would assume a contingencial conception of behavior. This is, precisely, our proposal: it would be only one conditioning process, the operant one, and as a result the respondent conditioning would be totally holded down the operant one, being only a fenomenological-operatory effect of such operant conditioning. Taking as context this approach, it can be recovered now the character of J. Dewey and his criticism to the reflex arch concept, made many time before the formulation of the two conditioning types. This author proposed a reconstruction of the reflex arch concept in terms of a process of sensitive-motorical coordination. According to his reconstruction, the suposed components of a reflex arch, sensations or stimuli, ideas or central conections and movements or motorical responses, would not exist separately. On the contrary, Dewey understood that it would only exist in which stimuli and responses would mutually co-determinated or co-defined or co-ordinated, and as a result it would not have stimuli or sensations that would not be themselves acts, stimuli coordinated with motorical activities (v.g., the activity of seeing); as well as it would not have responses that would not be themselves acts, responses coordinated with stimuli in order to transform such stimuli (v. g., the active change from seeing something to see another thing). This Dewey's criticism to the reflex arch concept would have a historical sense very valuable while opening the understanding of the existence of only one conditioning process in which the conditioned reflexes would be intrinsically fenomenical-operatory and effects or moments always depending on the contingencial evolution of the operant behaviors, that is, of complex acts that would include or coordinate other complex acts proportionally more simple, the respondent ones

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