Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals

Abstract

Abstract Liberal Fundamentalism is anti-reductionist about the justification for testimony-based beliefs. Liberal Fundamentalism holds that it is a priori necessary that if a subject S (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that P, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers justification on S's belief that P. Whether one finds this position initially plausible or an obvious non-starter depends in large part on one's prior position on the nature of epistemic justification. It is shown that some common arguments against it depend on substantive views on epistemic justification. A weak version is defended against the common objection that the Liberal view is too permissive. The weak version insists that only pro tanto justification results from basing beliefs on comprehending apparent presentation-as-true, and that additional supporting reasons are often required for on balance justification. The additional supporting reasons, however, need not be reductive reasons.

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