A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)

Abstract

Abstract Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as ‘‘Socrates is wise’’ are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g. Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g. wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property. This view is supposed to be general, applying to all predications, whether the subject of predication is a person, a planet, or a property.

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