Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy

Abstract

Contents: Preface Introduction: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy, Christoph Lumer. Part I Action, Intention, Intentionality: Folk concepts, surveys and intentional action, Frederick Adams and Annie Steadman Action and responsibility a a 2nd look at ascriptivism, Ralf Stoecker Action theory and cognitive turn: how can the content of intentions contribute to causing actions?, Sandro Nannini What do deviant causal chains deviate from?, Geert Keil The double failure of 'double effect', Neil Roughley. Part II Action-Theoretical Conceptions of Practical Deliberation: The will and the good, Hugh J. McCann The grounds and structure of reasons for action, Robert Audi An empirical theory of practical reasons and its use for practical philosophy, Christoph Lumer Anchors for deliberation, Michael E. Bratman. Part III Action-Theoretical Approaches to Freedom, Autonomy and Responsibility: Autonomy for real people, Michael Quante Forming the will freely, Gottfried Seebass An action can be both uncaused and up to the agent, Carl Ginet Free will: action theory meets neuroscience, Alfred R. Mele Belief and moral responsibility, Carlos J. Moya Autonomy and weakness of will, Thomas Spitzley: Indexes.

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