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This chapter takes up the question, 'What justifies tort law?' It identifies a domain that is central to if not co-extensive with 'torts,' and it finds that the domain consists of a motley collection of doctrines that are impossible to justify under any recognizable and attractive normative principles. Specifically, this chapter rejects that negligence is culpable and that there is a plausible form of 'fault' that lies between culpability and strict liability. The chapter then turns to causation, arguing that tort law takes inconsistent positions with respect to unforeseeable losses and that the notions of causation and counterfactual dependence on which tort law relies cannot be defensibly cabined. It concludes by suggesting the possibility that the legitimate goals of tort law might be best accomplished by other legal mechanisms.
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