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Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action*
16 references·1 citing·30 second hop
Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action* (2014)Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, t…Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion (2012)Stick to the Facts: On the No…Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Justification and the Truth-C…What do we Aim At When we Believe? (2011)What do we Aim At When we Bel…Should I Believe the Truth? (2010)Should I Believe the Truth?Weighing the aim of belief (2008)Weighing the aim of beliefA New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)A New Argument for Evidential…How Truth Governs Belief (2003)How Truth Governs BeliefEpistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique (2003)Epistemic Rationality as Inst…Does Belief Have an Aim? (2003)Does Belief Have an Aim?Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Knowledge and its LimitsBelief's Own Ethics (2002)Belief's Own EthicsThe Ethics of Belief (2000)The Ethics of BeliefKnowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and Its LimitsThe Moral Problem (1994)The Moral ProblemEpistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental (1981)Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic an…Problems of the Self (1973)Problems of the SelfIn Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief (2016)In Defense of Practical Reaso…Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Individualism and the Mental (1979)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)Normative Externalism (2019)Reasons First (2021)Speech Acts (1969)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Assessment Sensitivity (2014)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)The Aim Of Belief (2002)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (2020)The Epistemic and the Zetetic (2020)Moral Realism (1986)Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Fittingness First (2016)Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science (2000)The Subject of Virtue (2013)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More? (2005)Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020)Why Be Rational? (2005)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)Justification without Awareness (2006)Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism (2007)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Epistemic Vigilance (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,085 cited
  • 2002Knowledge and its Limits2,797 cited
  • 1994The Moral Problem1,383 cited
  • 2003How Truth Governs Belief654 cited
  • 2003Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique610 cited
  • 1973Problems of the Self549 cited
  • 2002Belief's Own Ethics538 cited
  • 2012Justification and the Truth-Connection533 cited
  • 2000The Ethics of Belief509 cited
  • 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism448 cited
  • 2003Does Belief Have an Aim?146 cited
  • 2012Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion103 cited
  • 2010Should I Believe the Truth?92 cited
  • 2011What do we Aim At When we Believe?91 cited
  • 1981Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental84 cited
  • 2008Weighing the aim of belief81 cited

Cited by

  • 2016In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief146 cited

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