Reasons as Evidence

Stephen Kearns · Daniel Star

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract Normative reasons are strange beasts. On the one hand, we are all intimately familiar with them. We couldn’t live for long without the guidance they continually offer us when we are trying to work out what to believe and what to do. At the same time, they seem to resist being analyzed in other terms. We can say that they “count in favor of ...” (acts, beliefs, intentions, desires, emotions, etc.), and some have thought that this rather uninformative characterization is pretty much all we will ever be able to come up with when attempting to answer the question, what are reasons? (Scanlon 1998: 17; Parfit 2007).

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References

2000What We Owe to Each Other 2002Knowledge and its Limits 2005Why Be Rational?2008Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?

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2012What is a reason to act?2015Normative reasons as good bases 2017The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning 2011Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness 2009Reasons and Evidence One Ought 2010Holism, Weight, and Undercutting 2019The Normative and the Evaluative 2014Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori

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