Genetic fatalism and social policy: the implications of behavior genetics research.

Abstract

Recent advances in molecular genetics methods have provided new means of determining the genetic bases of human behavioral traits. The impetus for the use of these approaches for specific behaviors depends, in large part, on previous familial studies on inheritance of such traits. In the past, a finding of a genetic basis for a trait was often accompanied with the idea that that trait is unchangeable. We discuss the definition of "genetic trait" and heritability and examine the relationship between these concepts and the malleability of traits for both molecular and nonmolecular approaches to behavioral genetics. We argue that the malleability of traits is as much a social and political question as it is a biological one and that whether or not a trait is genetic has little relevance to questions concerning determinism, free will, and individual responsibility for actions. We conclude by noting that "scientific objectivity" should not be used to conceal the social perspectives that underlie proposals regarding social change.

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