Helping Open-mindedness Flourish

Abstract

The ideal of open-mindedness first emerges in Greek philosophy and is succinctly and memorably captured in the Socratic notion of being prepared to follow the argument where it leads (Hare, 2009, p. 7). This means being genuinely concerned to avoid bias, wishful thinking, and other factors, that threaten to compromise a serious examination of the evidence (Hare, 2007, p. 21); and it means being ready to view one's conclusions, no matter how strongly supported, as potentially revisable in the light of further evidence given the fallible nature of knowledge claims (Hare, 1993, p. 88). An open-minded person is prepared to entertain any relevant evidence, to concede that an unwelcome conclusion indeed follows, and to allow that a position presently held cannot be sustained. In brief, open-mindedness is an intellectual virtue that reveals itself in a willingness to form and revise our ideas in the light of a critical review of evidence and argument that strives to meet the elusive ideals of objectivity and impartiality (Hare, 1993, p. 81).1 It is all too easy, of course, to fall short of the norms embedded in the moral and intellectual virtues. Threats of violence and other unwelcome consequences lead us to abandon our ideals in the face of risks and dangers; excuses, exceptions, and rationalizations very quickly undermine our allegiance to fundamental principles; fears, temptations and pressures weaken our resolve and override any inclination we might otherwise have to act virtuously. Open-mindedness is equally vulnerable. All too often, evidence that might point elsewhere is ignored or discounted, alternative possibilities are dismissed out of hand, and reasons are sought merely to support a conclusion that is already regarded as settled. The tenuous nature of open-mindedness has been a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy since Socrates first identified open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue and called attention to the prevalence of dogmatic certainty. Locke expresses concern about the tendency to make up our minds in advance that contrary views must be mistaken: Let not men think there is no truth but in the sciences that they study or the books that they read. To prejudge other men's notions before we have looked into them is not to show their darkness but to put out our own eyes. (Locke, 1966, p. 38) Hume notes that people are reluctant to weigh the evidence carefully in coming to a conclusion, retreating instead towards closed-mindedness in order to escape from uncertainty and confusion: To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy; and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of belief. (Hume, 1955, p. 188) Education often does little to foster an open-minded concern for evidence. Many teachers fail to model open-mindedness for their students: they resist alternative suggestions, refuse to admit their mistakes, and fail to indicate that present views may change; they encourage or tolerate an uncritical acceptance of ideas; and they are sometimes overly concerned to transmit their own convictions. Students come to hold beliefs non-evidentially because an emphasis is placed on being able to state the right answer even though one cannot offer a suitable justification (Green, 1972, p. 34); or because taken-for-granted assumptions are never subjected to critical examination that might reveal alternative possibilities (Freire, 1982). With respect to controversial matters, schools often fail to challenge the relativistic ethos that encourages students to think that their own opinion is as good as any other; and critical thinking may be presented in such a way that it only encourages cynicism about knowledge and inquiry. In these ways, education fails to develop an appreciation of the nature of serious inquiry and open-minded reflection is discouraged. …

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