28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games

Robert J. Aumann

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Game Theory and Applications Advanced Topology and Set Theory Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

We are concerned with infinite extensive games—not necessarily of perfect information—in which there may be a continuum of alternatives at some or all the moves; the games may also have unbounded or infinite play length. Our object is to define the notion of mixed strategy for such

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2006Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 195916. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games 1961The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments

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