Moral Generalities Revisited

Abstract

Abstract A great deal of discussion in ethical theory has recently centred on the particularity of moral situations. In some cases, the point of discussion has been to emphasize how important it is to attend to the nuances and contextual details of a case before applying any moral norms, rules, or principles to it. But in a number of discussions, the point has been to question the idea that there are any moral norms, rules, or principles capable of codifying the moral landscape. Theorists from a variety of camps, including neo-Aristotelians and a certain brand of British moral realist, have urged that moral answers resist capture in any general formulae. The situations we confront are often saturated with unique combinations of morally salient features; no principles, however subtle or complicated, provide an adequate guide or model of how we should navigate through them.

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