Scientific vs. Clinical-Based Knowledge in Psychology: A Concealed Moral Conflict

Abstract

Psychology and the other mental health professions are bitterly divided between the proponents of scientific vs. clinical-based knowledge. Though these two groups agree on little related to assessment, treatment or outcome evaluation, they share a belief in the moral neutrality of the knowledge they do possess. It is argued here that this moral neutrality is a myth, and that it is exactly the unacknowledged and incompatible moral positions inherent in clinical and research practices that are at the center of this controversy. The nature of moral problems, the fundamental moral value positions prevalent in our culture, and the specific moral values associated with each side of this schism are explored. While these moral differences may not all be resolved by being recognized and discussed, the process of dialogue can not but help us bridge the current chasm. To this end it is recommended that psychologists and other mental health professionals adopt a "truth-in-moral-packaging" rule that requires both clinicians and scientific researchers to define openly and clearly the moral objectives that infuse their work.

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