THE PROSECUTORS FALLACY AND DNA EVIDENCE

David J. Balding · Peter Donnelly

30 citations0/0 files storedUCL Discovery (University College London)

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Legal processes and jurisprudence Criminal Law and Evidence Forensic and Genetic Research

Abstract

The so-called ''Prosecutor's Fallacy'' in legal reasoning involving probabilities is explained. The dangers inherent in the fallacy can be important in the context of the very small probabilities often associated with DNA evidence. The appropriate method of reasoning using probabilities is also described. We argue that it is inappropriate for an expert witness to express an opinion as to whether or not two DNA samples have a common origin.

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2015Individual Differences in Speech Production and Perception 2009The Abduction of Sherlock Holmes 2002Evaluation and presentation of forensic DNA evidence in European laboratories 2016Differential reporting of mixed DNA profiles and its impact on jurists’ evaluation of evidence. An international analysis

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