DO MARKETS PENALIZE AGENCY CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONTROLLING AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS? EVIDENCE FROM CHILE

Fernando Lefort · Eduardo Walker

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Family Business Performance and Succession

Abstract

Using a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration.

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1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations 1999Corporate Ownership Around the World 1997Legal Determinants of External Finance 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences 2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 1998Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World

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2012Corporate Governance and Development 2008Hacia un mejor gobierno corporativo en Chile.2013Ownership Dynamics with Large Shareholders: An Empirical Analysis 2019Real earnings management and corporate governance: a study of Latin America 2013Internal corporate governance mechanisms as drivers of firm value: panel data evidence for Chilean firms 2017Group Affiliation and Ownership Concentration as Determinants of Capital Structure Decisions: Contextualizing the Facts for an Emerging Economy

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