Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Oriol Carbonell‐Nicolau · Richard P. McLean

26 citations0/0 files storedTheoretical Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 26 citations exist upstream.

References

1996Potential Games 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1973A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria 1986On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria 1999Infinite Dimensional Analysis 1989Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria 1999On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games 2001Competitive Price Discrimination

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.