Article1992

Negligence Versus Strict Liability Regimes in Auditing: An Experimental Investigation.

49 citations0/0 files storedThe Accounting Review

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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Abstract Assesses how different regimes of auditor liability affect the demand for and supply of auditing services. Adoption of complex strategies by economic agents; Usefulness of the experimental approach in aiding the understanding of the functioning of auditing markets; Strict liability regime as an alternative by auditors.

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1999Legal Penalties and Audit Quality: An Experimental Investigation*1995The effect of using diagnostic decision aids for analytical procedures on judges' liability judgments 2005An Experimental Investigation of Approaches to Audit Decision Making: An Evaluation Using Systems‐Mediated Mental Models*2007Strategic Errors and Audit Quality: An Experimental Investigation 2000An Experimental Investigation of Auditors' Liability: Implications for Social Welfare and Exploration of Deviations from Theoretical Predictions 1996Materiality and Risk Judgements: A Review of Users' Expectations 2011Legal systems and auditor independence

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