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A Banking Model in Which Partial Suspension Is Best

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References

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1964A Monetary History of the United States 1867-19602,110 cited
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1988Another Attempt to Explain an Illiquid Banking System: The Diamond and Dybvig Model With Sequential Service Taken Seriously308 cited

Cited by

2003Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation179 cited
1996On avoiding bank runs112 cited
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2009Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study108 cited
2006Bank runs and investment decisions revisited105 cited
2014Information Acquisition in Rumor‐Based Bank Runs98 cited
2000Diamond and Dybvig’s Classic Theory of Financial Intermediation: What’s Missing?91 cited
2009Run equilibria in the Green–Lin model of financial intermediation85 cited
2005Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard84 cited
2018Uncertainty Aversion and Systemic Risk71 cited
2010Herding and bank runs56 cited

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2003

Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale

53 cited

2006Suspension of payments, bank failures, and the nonbank public's losses52 cited

2012Wall Street and Main Street: the macroeconomic consequences of New York bank suspensions, 1866–191451 cited

2005Why banks should keep secrets46 cited

2007Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns46 cited