The political economy of central banking

Abstract

The political economy of monetary policy, Sheila Dow, Carlos Rodriguez Fuentes Some problems of the use of 'credibility' and 'reputation' to support the independence of central banks, Keith Bain Unemployment costs of inflation targeting, John Cornwall, Wendy Cornwall Leadership and stability in key currency systems - a simple game-theoretic approach, Peter Spahn Coercing credibility - neoliberal policies and monetary institutions in developing and transitional economies. Ilene Grabel Credibility - measurement and impacts, Central Bank experience and European perspectives, Georg Erber, Harald Hagemann The political economy of the European Central bank, Ian Begg, David Green The political economy of monetary policy - the effects of globalization and financial integration on the EU, Doren Isenberg Same tune, different words? the reaction functions of G7 monetary authorities, Jagjit Chadha, Norbert Janssen The independence of central banks - the case of Italy, Augusto Graziani Wicksellian Norm, Central Bank real interest rate targeting and macroeconomic performance, Mario Saccarechia New Zealand's experience with an independent Central Bank since 1989, Paul Dalziel.

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