Macroeconomic Determinants of Contingent Protection: The Case of the European Union

Bettina Becker · Martin Theuringer

12 citations0/0 files storedZeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik

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Global trade and economics World Trade Organization Law Global Trade and Competitiveness

Abstract

Abstract Contingent Protection, and in particular Antidumping (AD), has grown to become an important trade restricting device in the European Union (EU). This paper analyses whether internal and external macroeconomic pressure may contribute to explain the variations in the intensity of AD policy in the EU. The empirical analysis shows that the filing activity is inversely related to the domestic macroeconomic situation. This result suggests that AD is more a tool of protectionism rather than an instrument to countervail alleged unfair import competition.

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References

1984Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship 1992Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?1994Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States 1989Exchange Rates and "Unfair Trade"1996Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection Under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws 1999Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy 1995Political Economy and Contingent Protection 1987Import penetration, exchange rates, and protectionism in the United States

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