De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication 15

Dilip Ninan

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Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Abstract This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.

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References

1979The Problem of the Essential Indexical 1979Attitudes De Dicto and De Se 1983Philosophical Papers Volume I 1977Frege on Demonstratives 1999Context and Content 1980Syntax and semantics 9: Pragmatics 1999Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology 1985Philosophical Papers, Volume I.

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2015The Myth of the De Se 2012Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds 2012Centered communication 2017Outlook-based semantics 2020A Theory of Indexical Shift 2012Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value 2012A Two-Dimensionalist Guide to Conceptual Analysis 2022Modelling Selectional Super-Flexibility

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