SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Pay-to-Accounting Performance and Ownership Structure in Privately-Held Small Corporations
16 references·2 citing·35 second hop
Pay-to-Accounting Performance and Ownership Structure in Privately-Held Small Corporations (2001)Pay-to-Accounting Performance and Ownersh…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationAgency Costs and Ownership Structure (2000)Agency Costs and Ownership St…The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings (1999)The determinants and implicat…Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance (1999)Corporate governance, chief e…Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (1998)Theory of the Firm: Manageria…The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings (1997)The Determinants and Implicat…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1991)Optimal Incentive Contracts i…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)Agency Problems and Residual …Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Rewards for failure: an explanation for anomalous executive remuneration (2014)Rewards for failure: an expla…Stock option plan practices in family firms: The idiosyncratic private benefits approach (2013)Stock option plan practices i…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2001)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research (2009)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field (2001)The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash (2004)New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index (2010)Theory of Value (1959)Auditor size and audit quality (1981)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Law and Finance (1998)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)Managing Resources: Linking Unique Resources, Management, and Wealth Creation in Family Firms (2003)R2 around the world: New theory and new tests☆ (2005)Over-investment of free cash flow (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims4,877 cited
  • 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance4,334 cited
  • 1999The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings3,910 cited
  • 1998Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,749 cited
  • 2000Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,517 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1991Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence1,876 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property1,557 cited
  • 1997The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

1,052 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Stock option plan practices in family firms: The idiosyncratic private benefits approach22 cited
  • 2014Rewards for failure: an explanation for anomalous executive remuneration15 cited