Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy

Abstract

In economic terms, the environment is largely a public good. Contributing to a public good is costly to an individual, while the benefits are enjoyed by all. Despite this, many people voluntarily contribute to public goods, both in laboratory economic experiments and through day-to-day environmental decisions. These voluntary contributions are largely motivated intrinsically, that is satisfaction comes from the act itself rather than external rewards. Policy interventions are often required to increase the provision of public goods to the socially optimal level, which usually take the form of extrinsic incentives such as payments or regulations. Theoretical and empirical evidence from psychology and economics suggests that such extrinsic incentives can crowd out the intrinsic motivations which underlie voluntary contributions. As a result, a policy may have less than the anticipated impact. It is even possible for a costly policy intervention to lead to a decrease in overall public good provision, as individuals cease to contribute voluntarily. This paper argues that environmental policy design should proceed with caution in the presence of intrinsic motivations. Weak regulations and small, competitive financial incentives have the greatest potential for negative effects. Recognising and supporting existing efforts can crowd in, rather than crowd out, voluntary contributions. With careful design and implementation, there is the potential to maintain and support intrinsic motivations while also providing robust extrinsic incentives.

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