Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences

Ariel Rubinstein · Asher Wolinsky

57 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Applications Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This paper explicitly adds a time dimension to an implementation problem and introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation-proofness for the case of time-consuming renegotiation. The main insight gained is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be implemented in a renegotiation-proof manner. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

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References

1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration 1988Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation 1988A new approach to the implementation problem 1989Efficient allocation of a “prize”-King Solomon's dilemma

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