Credible enough? Forward guidance and perceived National Bank of Poland’s policy rule

Paweł Baranowski · Paweł Gajewski

16 citations0/0 files storedApplied Economics Letters

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Market Dynamics and Volatility Economic theories and models

Abstract

Forward guidance effectiveness is conditional upon its credibility. This policy, when taken as credible, should reduce the perceived impact of macroeconomic variables on the interest rate. Using the Taylor rule framework and employing micro-level data set, we test the perception of monetary policy in Poland among professional forecasters. Our results show that the Taylor principle is violated in the forward guidance period, which provides evidence for forward guidance credibility.

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1993Discretion versus policy rules in practice 1998Monetary policy rules in practice 2003Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy 2012International Journal of Central Banking 2014Do people understand monetary policy?2014Forward guidance at the zero lower bound 2012Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound 2009Do Wall Street economists believe in Okun’s Law and the Taylor Rule?

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