On the Economics of Industrial Safety

Abstract

Articles on this subject often begin by citing the National Safety Council statistics that over two million workers are injured each year, 14,000 are killed, and 190,000 are permanently disabled by industrial accidents.' The passage of the Williams-Steiger Bill in 19702 which established the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) clearly reflects our legislators' beliefs that this accident toll is intolerably high. Further, one can infer from the Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (NCSWCL)3 that the current compensation to victims of industrial accidents is grossly inadequate. Legislative actions at both federal and state levels have mainly been intended to achieve two objectives: (1) to reduce the frequency and severity of work-related injuries and diseases, and (2) to provide more equitable compensation to victims of these mishaps. The former has significance for economic efficiency, indicating that the present industrial accident toll exceeds some socially optimal accident toll. The latter is concerned with what constitutes just and fair compensation.4 An economist has something to say about the former issue, and I shall try to do so in this paper even though I agree with Professor Stigler who wrote, [l]acking real expertise and lacking also evangelical ardor, the economist has had little influence upon the evolution of economic policy.5

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