Religion and Philosophy

Abstract

but of this or that kind of matter ; this proof, in fact, is physics itself. . . . . . .   Religion and Philosophy (c) In the same way theology has to prove not the existence of any and every God, but of some particular God. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . The traditional Theistic proofs :— . . . . . . . . . . . .  (a) The are not the illicit product of thought in bondage to authority, but serious philosophical arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (b) Their method is reasonable and inevitable. . . . .  . Scheme of the remaining Chapters of Part II. . . . . . .  Chapter II. Matter  . The dualism of Matter and Mind :— . . . . . . . . . . .  (a) Not satisfactory as a working hypothesis. . . . .  (b) Interaction between the two is impossible. . . . .  (c) They cannot be distinguished. . . . . . . . . . . .  . Materialism :— . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (a) Materialism derives no support whatever from physics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (b) The paradox of causation :— . . . . . . . . . . .  i. Nothing is a cause or an effect except a total state of the universe. . . . . .  ii. The explanation given by causal methods is either a tautology or an infinite regress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii. Nothing is ever explained at all unless it is first assumed that the universe, though material, can cause its own states, i.e. is not subject to the law of causation. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (c) [no title] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . Materialism and Idealism (or Immaterialism) :— . . . .  (a) The scientist’s objection to Idealism : uniformity.  (b) The plain man’s objection : objectivity. . . . . . .  (c) Idealism and the higher Materialism. . . . . . . . 

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