Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism1

Abstract

This chapter considers recent defences of moral fictionalism by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West (2005) and Richard Joyce (2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). It first explains the route from moral error theory to revisionary moral fictionalism. It then argues against Nolan, Restall, and West that both hermeneutic and revisionary versions of moral fictionalism have trouble accommodating moral disagreement and that they face a version of the Frege-Geach problem. Three objections to Joyce’s defence of revisionary moral fictionalism are developed. First, the claim that false beliefs have detrimental effects, which is supposed to motivate the transition to pretence moral discourse, is subject to counterexamples. Second, the mechanism by which pretence moral belief is supposed to bolster self-control is unclear. Third, moral fictionalism gives conflicting practical recommendations. Finally, an alternative to moral fictionalism — moral conservationism — is elaborated and defended.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 30 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.