SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting · Study

ArticleShelves

ArticleThe Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting

John J. McCall1970

Article1970

The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting

49 citations·0/0 files stored·American Economic Review

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Auction Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

No abstract was published for this record.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 49 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large 1969Risk and Corporate Rates of Return 1965The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives

Cited by

2016Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding 2013Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty 2010Conceptualizing a two‐stage target‐cost arrangement for competitive cooperation 1994Choosing contractor payment terms

Related works

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under riskchapter · 1 shared reference 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoringarticle · 1 shared reference 1999Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychologyarticle · 1 shared reference 1976The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricingarticle · 1 shared reference 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]chapter · 1 shared reference

Details

Year1970

Typearticle

Published1970-01-01

VenueAmerican Economic Review

ISSN-L0002-8282

Languageen

Citations49

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

Identifiers

openalex_workW1510601820

Links

landingopen

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.

1970On the measurement of inequalityarticle · 1 shared reference