Two Kinds of Stakes

Alex Worsnip

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W‐stakes (world) track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A‐stakes (attitude) track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes (or relies on) the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W‐stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about knowledge‐attributions, but only the A‐stakes reading preserves the putative link between knowledge and practical reasoning that has motivated it.

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References

2002Knowledge and its Limits 2005Knowledge and Practical Interests 2003Knowledge and Lotteries 2005KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES 1992Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions 2009Knowledge in an Uncertain World 2002Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification 2008Knowledge and Action

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