Deception and Reasons to be Moral

Abstract

miscreants: There is no (good) reason to be Glaucon presents the classic version of the prob? lem in the Republic. Suppose, he suggests, one were to possess the ring of Gyges?a ring that makes the wearer invisible and guarantees impunity. Would one have any reason to honor commitments or to respect others' belongings? Most people would say, Glaucon reports, that when there is no danger of reprisal, there is no reason to be moral.1 Within the framework set by Glaucon's chal? lenge, two standard assumptions conspire to make a rational defense of morality exceptionally difficult. The first is that rationality consists solely in the maximization of expected utility, where utility is a relative and subjective measure of an individual's preference satisfaction. The second is that an ade? quate defense of the rationality of morality must not rely on our all too contingent feelings of sympathy or benevolence. Behind this second assumption is the Kantian conviction that a rational morality must apply to us just in virtue of our rational nature and not in virtue of our affective proclivities. And, in any case, relying on affective bonds when defending morality would subvert all attempts to convince the moral miscreants (who have no concern for others). Although I believe both assumptions are mistaken, in the discussion that follows I shall leave them largely unchallenged (except to the extent that the conclu? sions of this paper constitute, I believe, part of the evidence to be marshalled against the conception of rationality contained in the first assumption). Plato responds to Glaucon by emphasizing the incredible value of a well-ordered soul, and the disruptive effects immoral acts have on that order. According to Plato, no matter what benefits one can expect from acting immorally, they will never com? pensate for the loss of harmony within the soul.2 The costs of being immoral, he argues, will always over-burden the advantages, even when one's trans? gressions go undetected by others. As a result, Plato insists, it is always in each person's interest to be moral.

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