Imagining war: French and British military doctrine between the wars

Abstract

This text employs a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. It argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, it demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to such constraints as terms of conscription set by civilian policy-makers. In detailed case studies, the author examines doctrinal developments in France and Britain during the interwar period. She tests her argument against two of the most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War One explain the defensive doctrines on World War Two.

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