Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law

Abstract

Abstract This article discusses legal reasoning at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The following questions are addressed. First, the authors look at the way linguistic arguments are used in ECJ case‐law. Second, they consider whether the requirements of legal certainty, and more specifically that of predictability, may be fulfilled by reference to linguistic arguments in a multilingual legal system. The theoretical starting‐point is that of open‐endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving evaluative considerations. Consequently, when the ECJ uses linguistic arguments to justify a decision, it is an active agent choosing the meaning of words in a specific case. Essentially, the authors argue that legal reasoning based on linguistic arguments is particularly problematic from the viewpoint of legal certainty and predictability. In this respect, the key importance of systemic and teleological argumentation is emphasised in assuring convincing, acceptable and transparent legal reasoning especially in the context of multilingual EU law.

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