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• 2007The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions124 cited
• 1999Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy124 cited
• 2012Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?117 cited
• 2016Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset99 cited
• 2000Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis61 cited
• 2000Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?52 cited
• 2020The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance35 cited
• 2002Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy26 cited
• 2004Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency24 cited
• 2000Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets24 cited
• 2022Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation23 cited
• 2001Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions21 cited
• 2019Should African Monetary Unions Be Expanded? An Empirical Investigation of the Scope for Monetary Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa20 cited
• 2014Inflation Targeting and Fiscal Rules