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Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments

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2002Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation362 cited
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1989CHEAP TALK WITH TWO AUDIENCES271 cited
1997When does it take a Nixon to go to China?230 cited
2001

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Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest

207 cited

1995An experimental study of strategic information transmission201 cited

2006On the consistency and effectiveness of central bank communication: Evidence from the ECB183 cited

1997The advantage to hiding one's hand: Speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market137 cited

1997Independence and Accountability135 cited

2018Shaping Expectations and Coordinating Attention: The Unintended Consequences of FOMC Press Conferences127 cited

1991Refining cheap-talk equilibria126 cited

2002Does It Pay to be Transparent? International Evidence Form Central Bank Forecasts118 cited

1998Experimental evidence on the evolution of the meaning of messages in sender-receiver games : An experiment113 cited

1991Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary System112 cited

1999Sterilised central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market111 cited

2013Intentional Vagueness109 cited