21. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games

Robert J. Aumann · Michael Maschler

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Advanced Combinatorial Mathematics Game Theory and Applications

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1985The Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups 1996Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division 2000A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice 2012Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory 2003Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value 1966Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences 1991A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems 1971The kernel and bargaining set for convex games

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