Rules of Origin as export subsidies

Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa‐Eisenmann, Thierry Verdier

2006-02-23chapter33 citationsclosed

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Global trade and economics World Trade Organization Law Canadian Policy and Governance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter estimates the effect of NAFTA’s rules of origin (ROO) on Mexican access to the US market, treating ROO as politically-determined. Econometric estimates of bilateral disaggrated trade, with tariff preference and endogenous ROO as determinants, suggest that the creation of a captive market for upstream US intermediate-good producers is indeed one of the political determinants of NAFTA.

Citations in this library

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