Using a nominal GDP rule to guide discretionary monetary policy

Abstract

Given doubts about the reliability of the monetary aggregates as intermediate targets of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve attempts to meet its dual goals--gradual reduction of inflation and mitigation of cyclical downturns in output--through purely discretionary adjustments of an interest rate instrument in response to myriad incoming data. A procedure in which the Fed would consult a nominal GDP feedback rule, while retaining the flexibility to use discretion in its monetary policy decisions, might contribute to achieving its long-run inflation goal without significantly interfering with its ability to pursue its short-run cyclical goal. This paper describes such a policy regime, and presents some empirical evidence pertinent to an assessment of how it might work.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 30 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.