An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism

David Enoch

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Abstract Robust Metanormative Realism is the view, somewhat roughly, that there are response-independent, non-natural, irreducibly normative truths, perfectly universal and objective ones, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. Normative truths include— but are not limited to the truths of morality, so Robust Metanormative Realism is the natural generalization of Robust Metaethical Realism.

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2016Moral Testimony 2009Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?2014Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work 2021Practical Expressivism 2010Recent Work on Normativity 2006Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens 2020Constructing Practical Reasons 2019Morality and Epistemic Judgement

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