Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing

1987-02-01articleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics571 citationsclosed

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Economic theories and models

Abstract

Stephen D. Williamson; Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 102, Issue 1, 1 February

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References

1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information

1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring

1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification

1985Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

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