Ockham’S Reliabilism And The Intuition Of Non-Existents

Abstract

Ockhams stance toward skepticism has been variously assessed throughout the last hundred years of medieval scholarship, and much of the fuss, as it turns out, revolved around his controversial thesis about the intuition of non-existent beings. This chapter first recalls the main components of Ockhams relevant doctrine, and then successively considers what theological and philosophical reasons he may have had for them. The main conclusion is that although he did have theological reasons to some extent, the most distinctive features of Ockhams thought on the matter are based on a properly philosophical attitude with respect to knowledge, which can legitimately be labelled, in contemporary terms, as a strong form of reliabilism . Keywords: intuition of non-existents; Ockham; philosophical attitude; reliabilism; theological reasons

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