Imagination, content, and the self

Abstract

I begin with a discussion of two ways of imagining something: ‘from the inside ’ and ‘from the outside’. My interest in this topic is two-fold: First, I want to see what studying this topic can teach us about the nature of men-tal content—in particular, about the content of de se and de re thoughts. Second, I want to formulate an account of this distinction which will help us understand the role these two types of imagining play in philosophical thought experiments about personal identity over time. The first three chapters of this dissertation focus on the first set of issues, issues of imag-ination and content. Chapter 4 extends and applies some of these insights to a puzzle about personal identity over time.

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